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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Yutdeny Rosa McLeod appeals from the district court's order revoking her 
probation and ordering her sentence executed. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
McLeod was convicted of grand theft by unauthorized control. (R., pp. 
105-11.) She was sentenced to 12 years with three years fixed, the sentence 
was suspended, and she was placed on probation for a period of 13 years. (R., 
pp. 106-07.) McLeod signed a probation agreement. (R., pp. 114-16.) Shortly 
thereafter, she was deported. (See Tr., p. 74, L. 17 - p. 75, L. 13.) 
Approximately four years later, the state filed a motion to revoke McLeod's 
probation, and attached a report of probation violation. (R., pp. 130-35.) The 
state asserted that McLeod had failed to report to probation and parole as 
instructed and failed to obey all laws by illegally re-entering the United States. 
(R., p. 131.) 
McLeod denied the allegations and an evidentiary hearing was held on the 
state's motion to revoke probation. (R., pp. 161-62.) At the hearing, McLeod 
argued that her statements to Immigration Enforcement Agent Jim Rees should 
be suppressed because they were obtained in contravention of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). (Tr., p. 54, Ls. 2-11.) The hearing was continued 
to permit the state to respond to McLeod's assertion that her statements should 
be suppressed. (Tr., p. 54, L. 13 - p. 57, L. 16.) The state submitted a 
memorandum in which it argued that Agent Rees was not required to advise 
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McLeod of Miranda prior to questioning her. (R., pp. 172-77.) After hearing 
argument from both parties, the district court agreed with the state and permitted 
Agent Rees to testify as to his conversation with McLeod. (Tr., p. 86, L. 8 - p. 
96, L. 14.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court made the following 
findings of fact: 
The facts as established in this record show that this 
defendant was sentenced by this court on April 25, 2007, for the 
charge of grand theft by unauthorized control. 
She was ordered to serve a sentence of 12 years: 3 years 
fixed, 9 years indeterminate; and that term was suspended for a 
probation period of 13 years, beginning on April 25, 2007. 
Thereafter, on April 30th, 2007, defendant met with Leslie 
Horner in the Twin Falls County Jail. Ms. Horner went over with her 
the exhibits to the judgment. She initialed each paragraph requiring 
her to comply with the conditions of probation and signed the 
exhibit, which was then appended to the original judgment and is 
now contained in the court's file of which this court has previously 
noted it has taken judicial notice. 
During that meeting, Ms. Horner indicated that, in her 
opinion, Ms. McLeod understood that if she returned to, or was -
excuse me - if she was released from custody, she was to report in 
to the Department of Correction. Now, that certainly requires Ms. 
Horner to make a leap of logic in terms of what she went over with 
Ms. McLeod and with what is stated clearly in the exhibits, but that 
is what my memory is and what my notes show that she indicated. 
At some point in the future she received a phone call from 
Mr. Stanley Holloway of the prosecutor's office. They had been 
informed that Ms. McLeod was seen in the Twin Falls area, I 
believe, 2011. 
Ms. Horner spoke with her own supervisor, because she 
testified Ms. McLeod's file had been moved to the deportation files, 
so that they should figure out where to start looking. She then 
spoke with her district manager and decided to check with Ms. 
McLeod's parents in Shoshone. She followed up, ultimately going 
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to Shoshone, speaking to Ms. McLeod's father. He would not allow 
them in the house. Or excuse me. That was actually Deputy 
Gregory who went to the father's home and he was not allowed in. 
A warrant was issued thereafter for Ms. McLeod's arrest on 
the allegations that she violated her probation. After the warrant 
was issued, Ms. Horner herself went back to the residence in 
Lincoln County with another probation officer. At that point, they 
were met by Ms. McLeod's mother who invited them in. They 
walked through the home, looking for Ms. McLeod, to see if she 
had been there. There was a room. It appeared someone had 
been sleeping there recently in the home. Ms. Horner did find a 
form with the defendant's name along with that of her daughter and 
that was admitted as Exhibit 4 and is dated January 20th , 2011. 
This court heard this afternoon from Amanda Sanders who 
testified that on or about January 20th, at St. Luke's Clinic, she did 
see the defendant in the Twin Falls [sic] at the clinic, thus 
confirming what appeared to be on Exhibit 4 as located by Ms. 
Horner. 
They ultimately, that is, the probation officers, left the 
residence in Lincoln County; and she returned to her office. 
Ultimately, Ms. McLeod was located in Suffolk County, New York, 
and was arrested on this court's warrant along with a federal 
detainer. She was, that is, Ms. McLeod, during her period of time in 
Nicaragua, on an unsupervised status at the Department of 
Correction. That unsupervised status was never communicated to 
Ms. McLeod. 
Mark Roger Rees testified that he is employed with [the] 
Department of Homeland Security and interviewed the defendant in 
the Twin Falls County Jail on March 8th. The purpose of that 
contact was to determine whether the information he'd received 
was accurate relative to her status as a foreign-born citizen, her 
current permanent address, where she had come into the country 
from, if she was smuggled and so forth. The defendant told Mr. 
Rees that she came here illegally through Montana, paying a 
smuggler $8,000 to cross the border. That was earlier in 2011. He 
could not recall the exact date. She did inform Mr. Rees that she 
came to Idaho after entering the United States. 
He did indicate that his purpose in interviewing her was not 
to develop a case for the government, although his information 
could certainly be transmitted to another agent of the Department of 
Homeland Security and that agent could make a file based on his 
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information transmitted to the Assistant United States Attorney for 
consideration of prosecution. 
Ms. McLeod had also informed Mr. Rees that she was back 
in Idaho because one of her children were [sic] sick. Her children 
are United States citizens, and she told Mr. McLeoad [sic] - or Mr. 
Rees - that she didn't know she was on probation. However, she 
knew she was back in Idaho on a probation warrant. 
{Tr., p. 119, L 21 p. 123, L 24.) The court then found that McLeod had 
violated her probation. (Tr., p. 124, L. 2 - p. 126, L. 2.) Specifically, the court 
found that McLeod failed to report to probation when she reentered the United 
States and that she illegally reentered the United States. (Tr., p. 124, L. 9 - p. 
125, L. 19.) It held, "The record is clear she was deported to Nicaragua. She 
made illegal entry through Montana per her own testimony and thereby has 
violated [her probation]." (Tr., p. 124, L. 25 - p. 125, L. 3.) 
The court revoked McLeod's probation and ordered her sentence 
executed. (R., pp. 186-90.) McLeod filed a rule 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence, which was denied. (R., pp. 194-96, 204-08.) McLeod timely appealed. 
(R., pp. 213-16.) 
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ISSUE 
McLeod states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it admitted, over Ms. McLeod's 
objection, testimony as to statements obtained in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Because McLeod was not subjected to custodial interrogation when 
questioned by the immigration officer, has McLeod failed to show that the district 
court erred in admitting the statements that she made to Agent Rees at her 
probation revocation proceeding? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because McLeod Was Not Subjected To Custodial Interrogation, McLeod Has 
Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Admitting The Statements That 
She Made To Officer Rees 
A. Introduction 
McLeod asserts that the district court erred when it admitted statements 
that she made to Agent Rees that resulted, in part, in the revocation of her 
probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-15.) McLeod contends that the statements 
were inadmissible because she was not given the Miranda advisement prior to 
speaking with Agent Rees. (Id.) McLeod's argument fails, however, because 
she was not subjected to custodial interrogation and Miranda was therefore 
inapplicable. Because Agent Rees was not required to give McLeod the Miranda 
advisement prior to speaking with her, her statements to him were fully 
admissible at her probation revocation proceeding. Even if the district court erred 
in admitting the statements, the error was harmless because McLeod's 
statements were not necessary for the court to find that she had illegally re-
entered the United States. Further, the court found two separate probation 
violations and McLeod has only contested one on appeal. The uncontested 
probation violation is sufficient to revoke McLeod's probation and any error in the 
court's revocation of her probation on the second contested ground is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court "exercises free review in determining whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found by the 
trial court." State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 111, 952 P.2d 1245, 1247 (1998). In 
making its determination, the court will give deference to findings of the trial court 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous. & 
C. Because McLeod Was Not Subjected To Custodial Interrogation, The 
District Court Did Not Err In Admitting The Statements That McLeod Made 
To Agent Rees 
The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prevents a person from being 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself. It has 
long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to testify 
at a criminal trial in which he or she is a defendant, but also entitles the person 
not to answer official questions put to the person in any other proceeding, civil or 
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him or her in 
future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984). To 
safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), that before an individual 
is subjected to custodial interrogation, the interrogating officer must advise the 
individual of certain rights, including the right to remain silent. 
The test to determine whether questioning is an interrogation within the 
meaning of Miranda is whether, under all of the circumstances involved in a 
case, the questions are "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
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the suspect." United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(quoting United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1997). 
The test is objective. United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F2d 1485, 1489 (9th 
Cir. 1985). The subjective intent of the questioning agent is relevant but not 
conclusive. lit. The relationship between the question asked to the crime 
suspected is highly relevant. lit. 
There was no reason for Agent Rees to believe that his questioning of 
McLeod was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from her. 
Deportation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions but are civil in nature. 
United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002). Agent Rees 
testified that he was an immigration agent with the Department of Homeland 
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 21-24.) He 
explained that when foreign-born individuals are arrested, his job is to interview 
them and to determine how to process them. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 3-14.) He explained 
that he files a report with the Department of Homeland Security. (Tr., p. 104, Ls. 
12-14.) He also testified that he would not be the agent that would investigate 
McLeod for criminal prosecution. (Tr., p. 109, Ls. 3-6.) Agent Rees explained 
that he did not question McLeod about her probation. (Tr., p. 107, Ls. 4-10.) He 
was not even aware of the specific allegations relative to her probation. (Tr, p. 
107, Ls. 21-24.) Agent Rees only knew that McLeod was arrested on a probation 
violation warrant and was also being held on an immigration detainer. (Tr., p. 
108, Ls. 1-18.) Because Agent Rees was simply questioning McLeod in relation 
to her status as an alien for civil deportation proceedings, he had no reason to 
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believe that his questioning of McLeod was "reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response from [her}." 
United States v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2002), is instructive. 
Salgado was arrested in 1998 on state weapons charges in California. Salgado, 
292 F.3d at 1171. A federal immigration officer, Agent Lundgren, interviewed 
him to determine if he was subject to an administrative action for deportation. kt 
Salgado admitted that he was a Mexican citizen and present in the United States 
without documentation. kt Agent Lundgren did not give Miranda warnings to 
Salgado prior to interviewing him. _kl Salgado was deported to Mexico. _kl One 
year later, Salgado was arrested in California on two outstanding misdemeanor 
warrants. ~ A different immigration officer reviewed Salgado's immigration file 
and arrested Salgado for being found in the United States without permission 
after previously being deported in violation of federal law. _kl 
Salgado moved to suppress his statements to Agent Lundgren. Id. at 
1172. The district court found that the immigration officer's sole purpose in 
eliciting Salgado's biographical information was to determine if he was subject to 
an administrative action for deportation. kt It also found that there was no 
evidence that Salgado was suspected of a crime to which his nationality was 
relevant, and that the immigration officer could not reasonably anticipate the 
future incriminating quality of the statements that she elicited. ~ 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Id. It 
explained, "the test to determine whether questioning is interrogation within the 
meaning of Miranda is whether under all the circumstances involved in a given 
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case, the questions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from 
the subject." ~ (internal quotations omitted.) In then held: 
If Salgado had been interviewed in connection with a 
"prosecution for violating the immigration laws," or if Salgado had 
been in custody on charges relating to his immigration status, then 
questions about birthplace and citizenship might have been 
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response in which case 
he should have been Mirandized before-hand. 
The Lundgren interview occurred on March 31, 1998 when 
Salgado was in jail on state charges for crimes having nothing to do 
with his status as an alien. Lundgren was an INS agent handing 
civil immigration matters; her inquires of Salgado were routine. 
Although the interview occurred at the jail, it was solely for the 
administrative purpose of determining whether Salgado was 
deportable when he got out of jail. Lundgren had no reason to 
believe that Salgado's statements would be incriminating. She did 
not refer Salgado (or any other alien whom she interviewed and 
who turned out to be undocumented) to the criminal branch of the 
INS for investigation or to law enforcement for prosecution. All she 
did was place an INS detainer on Salgado to make sure that he 
appeared before an immigration judge after his incarceration. 
Id. (emphasis in original). The similarities between Salgado's situation and 
McLeod's situation are striking. Like Salgado, McLeod was not being interviewed 
in connection with a prosecution for violating immigration laws. Like Salgado, 
McLeod was not in custody on charges related to her immigration status. Like 
Salgado, McLeod was in jail on state charges having nothing to do with her 
status as an alien. Like Salgado, the agent interviewing McLeod simply handled 
routine civil immigration matters, and like Salgado, the interview was solely for 
the administrative purpose of determining whether McLeod was deportable when 
she got out of jail. Thus, as in Salgado, Agent Rees was not required to advise 
McLeod of Miranda rights prior to interviewing her. 
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Further, the district court could have found that McLeod violated her 
probation by illegally entering the United States without reliance upon McLeod's 
statements to Agent Rees. Agent Rees identified McLeod without objection. 
(Tr., p. 50, Ls. 13-25.) He further explained that he knew McLeod had previously 
been deported and he had "her alien registration file with the previous 
deportation in it." (Tr., p. 101, Ls. 18-23.) He also testified that McLeod was 
currently deportable for illegal re-entry into the United States. (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 4-
6.) Based on Agent Rees's identification of McLeod, his testimony that he had 
reviewed her file and that she had previously been deported, and his testimony 
that McLeod was currently deportable for illegal re-entry, the court did not need 
McLeod's statements to find that she had violated her probation by illegally 
entering the United States and violating a federal law. 
Finally, it is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of 
the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2602, 
19-2603, 20-222; State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 636, 84 P.3d 571, 572 (Ct. App. 
2003). During probation revocation proceedings, two threshold questions are 
presented - whether the probationer violated the terms of probation and, if so, 
whether probation should be revoked. Done, 139 Idaho at 637, 84 P .3d at 573; 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 1232 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The state alleged that McLeod violated her probation by 1) failing to report 
to probation and parole as instructed and 2) failing to obey all municipal, county, 
state and federal laws by illegally re-entering into the United States. (R., pp. 130-
31.) On appeal, McLeod does not contest the district court's finding that she 
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violated her probation by failing to report to probation and parole as instructed. 
Nor were any of her statements to Agent Rees used in proving this violation. 
Rather, she solely contests the use of her statements to support the state's 
allegation that she committed a crime by illegally re-entering the United States. 
However, because her probation could be revoked for the violation that she failed 
to report to probation as ordered, she has failed to show that the district court 
erred in revoking her probation. 
McLeod's contention that the district court improperly used her statements 
to Agent Rees as an aggravating factor when announcing its decision to revoke 
her probation and execute her underlying sentence without reduction is without 
merit. (See Appellant's brief, p. 15.) McLeod argues that the district court 
improperly used her statement to Agent Rees that she had paid $8,000.00 to a 
smuggler to regain admittance to the United States when the court noted, 
"[T]here's been not one cent paid to these people [in restitution] .. . You had 
money to get back into the [United} [S]tates." (Tr., p. 150, Ls. 1-18.) As 
discussed above, Agent Rees was not required to give McLeod the Miranda 
advisements prior to interviewing her. However, even if McLeod's statements 
were admitted in error, the fact that McLeod had not paid any restitution was 
clear on the record and was, therefore, appropriately used as an aggravating 
factor. For these reasons, McLeod has failed to demonstrate that the district 
court erred in revoking her probation and ordering her sentence executed without 
reduction. 
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D. McLeod's Argument Also Fails Because Miranda Warnings Are Not A 
Prerequisite To Admissibility Of Statements In Probation Violation 
Proceedings 
Even if the statements at issue had been taken in violation of Miranda, 
McLeod has failed to show error because the remedy for a Miranda violation is 
exclusion of the statements from a trial, not probation proceedings. 
The right to warnings about the rights to silence and counsel stem from 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Howes v. Fields, _ U.S. 
_, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189-92 (2012) (Miranda rights are designed to protect 
against coercion of waiver of Fifth Amendment rights inherent in custodial 
interrogation) Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 435 n.22 (1984) (Miranda 
designed to neutralize the "threat to a citizen's Fifth Amendment rights" created 
by custodial interrogation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Fifth 
Amendment right to silence, however, is not "available to a probationer'' such that 
the state may compel answers to incriminating questions in relation to probation 
violations "as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in 
a criminal proceeding." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
Probationers have fewer rights they can assert against governmental 
intrusion than do other citizens. Probation officers can, and do, require 
probationers to answer questions, on threat of probation violation, about whether 
they are complying with the conditions of probation. The state "may validly insist 
on answers to even incriminating questions" as part of its probation system. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7. Because McLeod did not have a legal right against 
compelled self incrimination or to counsel in relation to questions about whether 
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she was in compliance with the terms of probation, there can be no legal violation 
of her rights in the failure to tell her she had such a right. See State v. Aldape, 
794 P.2d 672 (Kan. 1990) (statements to probation officer about compliance with 
probation are not incriminating under Fifth Amendment and therefore evidence of 
such statements is admissible in probation violation proceedings regardless of 
whether Miranda warnings were given). 
In addition, exclusion is inappropriate in probation violation proceedings. 
"Most Federal courts of appeal that have considered whether the exclusionary 
rule should apply to probation revocation hearings have concluded that it should 
not." Commonwealth v. Vincente, 540 N.E.2d 669, 671 (1989) (citing United 
States v. Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 830 (3rd Cir. 1983) (and cases cited)). The 
reason for this is that reliable evidence should be available to serve the purposes 
of probation and excluding reliable evidence from probation proceedings will not 
serve the deterrent effect behind the exclusionary rule. ~ (citing United States 
v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
On appeal McLeod merely assumes that she was both entitled to Miranda 
rights if she was subjected to custodial interrogation regarding whether she had 
violated probation. The law, however, shows that neither assumption is valid. 
On the contrary, because the underlying rights were not applicable to her she 
was not entitled to warnings about those rights, and she was also not entitled to 
exclusion of evidence at her probation violation hearing. McLeod has therefore 
failed to show error in the admission of evidence that she admitted having 
entered the United States illegally. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking McLeod's probation and ordering her sentence executed. 
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